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We are entering the age of genetically engineered drugs
designed to stop the progression of multiple organ system
failure [1]. Research and development of these drugs will
necessarily be expensive, and this cost will be passed on to
consumers in one form or another. There is no clear
reimbursement for patients getting these drugs, and so
facilities with tight budgets will simply avoid giving them,
‘referring’ cases up the line to those facilities at which the
buck stops. Much has been written about expense versus
benefit for high-tech care plans, but in reality genetically
engineered drugs may indeed be the first to ‘break the bank’
[2]. They may also be the first drugs with the capability of
wiping other useful treatments off the slate in hospital
pharmacies with limited resources. This eventually begs the
question of public access expectations, and in what kinds of
patients we will be using these resources.
Nursing home patients with unrelenting dementia,
musculoskeletal contractures, decubiti, and a history of
multiple admissions for ‘sepsis’ will never ‘improve’ beyond
their nonfunctional baseline no matter what treatment is
afforded them. However, they can fall within inclusion
criteria for otherwise effective drug therapies when quality
of life (QoL) is not considered. If the available evidence
shows that genetically engineered drugs are effective (all
other factors being equal) in reversing organ system
failure, then we must find a place for those agents no
matter what the cost. Nevertheless, cost must be a factor
in our usage. The issue of how much we are willing to
spend to maintain ‘nonfunctional’ baselines will have to be
addressed [3]. We once viewed QoL as a theoretical
notion with no practical impact. Genetically engineered
drugs have changed that. The following case forces us to
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Abstract
Costly genetically engineered therapies, which threaten to cripple the health care industry economy and
undermine the common good if applied indiscriminately, loom on the horizon. The spectrum of applicable
candidates include moribund nursing home patients at the end of life. They will be fair game for therapy
that will ultimately send them back to nursing homes to return later with the same condition. ‘Quality of life’
assessments that limit patient autonomy may be forced as a result. Discussants from South Africa, New
Zealand, and the USA suggest methods to deal with this issue in a just and ethical framework.
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debate the extent to which we must consider QoL issues
in the new millennium.
The case
A patient from a skilled nursing home is admitted to a small,
local hospital with pneumonia, respiratory failure, and
hypotension. The patient is 86 years old, has severe dementia,
diabetes, hypertension, and chronic congestive heart failure,
and has had multiple episodes of pneumonia and several
large decubiti on his backside. His family asks for ‘everything
to be done’, and specifically mention a new drug for the
treatment of severe sepsis. They ask the doctors at the local
hospital for that drug but the pharmacy formulary does not
include it. The hospital is therefore obliged to send the patient
to the nearest facility that is able to administer the drug.
You are the doctor at the regional, tertiary referral center
that is obliged to accept patients from the small, local
hospital. You get the call late on Friday night and the patient
is duly transferred. On arrival, he is hypotensive, has a high
white cell count, a raised temperature, bilateral infiltrates,
and Gram-positive bacteria growing from two blood
cultures; these are all inclusion criteria for administering the
new drug.
The patient has been on three antibiotics for 2 days and does
not appear to be improving. He requires mechanical
ventilation, continuous infusion of norepinepherine to
maintain his blood pressure, and his creatinine is rising. He
responds to external pain stimulus by groaning and does not
follow commands.
The new genetically engineered drug on the formulary costs
US$8000 per treatment course. Would you give this
treatment to this patient?
The dilemma of intensive care
Richard Burrows
We live in a society with shared benefits and with varying
rights and obligations. The physician is under imperatives to
use effective drugs to resolve disease, returning patients to
an ‘acceptable’ life. However, the ‘tragedy of the commons’
[4] suggests that, without rules and regulations, individuals
may take more than their fair share, destroying the common
good. It is clear that the cost of treatment has increased to
the point that society has begun to question the large
amounts of funds that are expended in the last few days or
weeks of life. Exclusionary triage decisions or ‘do not
resuscitate’ in its broadest sense have become little more
than arguments of rationing, no matter what the wealth of the
society is. The Oath of Hippocrates and more modern
declarations ill prepare the physician for a role in rationing; in
fact, they do not even address the issue of how to choose
between patients. The issue is confused further because the
benefits of modern medicine are less clear than when
therapies such as antibiotics and mechanical ventilation were
initially introduced and gave clear advantage to treatment
over disease. Benefits today are incrementally smaller, with
debatable reductions in mortality from many diseases treated
in intensive care and complicated by surrogate markers of
improvement [5,6].
It is clear that there are no fine dividing lines in severity of
disease that effectively delineate which treatment may be
expected to be successful or ineffective. There is no
guaranteed point short of decomposition [7] at which death
can be defined. Measured against this certainty of death is
the probability, however small, that a specific treatment might
work. The ‘number needed to treat’ in order to effect a
survivor may be, for example, 16, but in the case presented
above this also means that US$128,000 has been spent to
effect one survivor. This is an expensive proposition.
A 750-bed referral hospital in South Africa has a yearly
budget of some US$25,000,000. The intensive care unit
(ICU) admits approximately 500 patients a year on a budget
of approximately US$1,500,000. Severe shortfalls in
resources mean that the unit must refuse admission to a
large number of potential cases. The crude mortality rate is
40%, or approximately 200 patients, most of whom die in
multiple organ failure with some degree of sepsis. It is clear
that the use of the therapy under discussion would quickly
drain the budget, resulting in inability to admit other patients
who potentially may survive if treated. In addition, if the
patient has other chronic organ system failure, then it can
reasonably be argued that he has entered a death spiral in
which he may be expected to die with infection rather than
because of it. The problem is simply where should one draw
the line and decide to stop at some point short of a clear,
irrefutable death.
It should be clear that if a treatment is of proven efficacy then
it should be offered as a right rather than in response to a
demand. In the face of uncertainty, however, the real issue is
who should make the decision? The present medical system
has been described as an ethical mess [8] as a result of
paternalistic practice, but dictates of autonomy have made
any decision contrary to that of the patient or surrogate little
more than an illegal act. The physician who falls between the
stool of guarding of the coffers of society and that of
advocating patient autonomy is in trouble because these two
issues are irreconcilable, especially for those who insist that
death must be avoided at all costs. If physicians are to be
merely ‘purveyors of vendibles’ [9], however, then those in
need must invariably suffer. Issues of cost effectiveness must
necessarily force the pendulum to swing away from open-
ended patient autonomy to a more rational decision-making475
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Are all God’s creatures welcome in the fast lane?
David Crippen
We are entering an age of expensive genetically engineered
therapeutic agents that have some modest clinical utility but
also the potential to break the pharmacy bank if used
indiscriminately [10]. These therapies are different from
expensive transplants, which have clear indications for
isolated organ system failure. Genetically engineered
therapeutic agents are marketed for multiple organ failure.
These are the first really phenomenally expensive therapies
that are applicable to a very large population desiring them.
The new genetically engineered therapeutic agents are
specifically targeted to treat advanced organ system
dysfunction resulting from sepsis. Where is the largest
population of patients that enter the hospital septic? Are
they young, healthy, and vital people? Not in my experience.
A high percentage of them are old, infirm, and facing the
end of life [8]. A large number of this population reside in
skilled nursing homes and suffer from the comorbidity of
organic brain syndrome that is irreversible. If the
pathophysiology of sepsis fits into the inclusion criteria,
virtually any moribund nursing home patient will be fair
game for expensive therapy that will simply bring them back
to a nonfunctional baseline. Because of the expense,
‘restrictions’ will be placed at different levels on the use of
these drugs, but I strongly suspect that those restrictions
will be based on inclusion criteria, and not exclusions based
on potential QoL [11].
Accordingly, these new therapies put us in a huge ethical
quandary. If we use this drug as a knee jerk reflex in every
patient that meets rather liberal inclusion criteria then we
have a real chance of breaking the bank, and thus crowding
out other treatments that hospitals will no longer be able to
afford. If we demand parameters of QoL as exclusion criteria,
then we will necessarily be guilty of someone’s estimation of
discrimination. We will be discriminating on the basis of our
personal biases as to what constitutes an acceptable post-
treatment QoL.
What to do?
I believe we have to make some concrete decisions here. Do
these therapeutic agents work or not? If we find evidence
that they do, then we must find a place for them no matter
what it costs, but cost must factor into our usage. I strongly
believe and will try to defend the controversial proposition
that QoL estimations are no longer ethereal pie daydreams of
ethicists in ivory towers. Futility can now be measured in
dollars and cents and pie charts. One estimation suggests
that approximately 16 patients must be treated to save one
life, at a cost of US$128,000. At those prices we need to
look closely at that one life [12]. There is dubious utility in
treating 16 patients at a cost of US$128,000 to save the life
of a patient who will be sent back to a nursing home in their
baseline nonfunctional condition only to return later with the
same dilemma.
In the past, we subscribed to the notion that the amount of
money spent on patients with dubious potential benefit was
relatively small and did not impact on the amount spent for
‘appropriate care’. There was room for ‘benefit of the doubt’
in critical care. That age of open-ended altruism may well end
with genetically engineered therapeutic agents. For perhaps
the first time in our practice, futility has a new name and that
name is ‘expensive out of proportion to benefit’. Simply put,
we may simply not be able to afford the benefit of the doubt;
we will have to take steps to quantify it so that it can be
avoided by formal protocol, and not bedside
micromanagement.
This patient should not get the drug.
Money for technology and the saline’s for free
R Phillip Dellinger
Bioethics are not globally consistent [13]. In the US health care
system we tend to honor patient and family decisions for full
support on request. Unless there is a resource shortage (blood,
ICU beds, etc.), we do not overtly ration. With that perspective
in mind, an US intensivist can make his or her life simpler by
treating all patients who are of full resuscitation status alike,
regardless of age, baseline status, or terminal illness.
We would likely all agree that a nonresponsive 95-year-old
with widely metastatic adenocarcinoma is not a good
candidate for expensive life-prolonging treatment, but such
treatment in a young, previously healthy individual with no
contraindications would be strongly desirable. However, I
believe that bedside physicians should not apply their own
value judgments to the treatment of these two patients
because the end does not justify the means. Somewhere
between these two, health care providers have a potential to
apply their own value system to QoL assessments, and this
always gets in the way of patient autonomy, which should be
kept sacrosanct [14]. In addition, micromanaging at the
bedside and saving US$6000 in expensive technology leads
to what? Where does one establish the cutoff for what is too
process that takes into account the medical decision to stop
questionable treatment.
Under the circumstances, I would not administer this
treatment to this patient.476
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expensive for someone who remains in full resuscitation
status? Is it $7000, $5000, $3000, or $1000? Who is to
say?
I wish someone could show me that the saving led to 200
needy children in inner city Camden, New Jersey, receiving
routine vaccinations, but I wonder whether such benefits
manifest other than in mythology. I also believe that patients
who are not likely to benefit from expensive technology for
reasons other than clinical applicability should simply have
their resuscitation status changed to ‘no resuscitation’.
Simply establishing that status would, by itself, resolve the
expensive technology problem. The expense problem occurs
when the preferred code status by the intensivist cannot be
previously established, and the patient becomes incompetent
to speak for themselves. In such a case there are two typical
scenarios. One is that the next of kin cannot be reached or
there are none. In that circumstance I would be inclined to
use my own judgment and not use expensive new
technology. In the second circumstance, the patient or next
of kin disagrees with you about code status and desires that
‘everything’ be done. In that circumstance, it is risky in US
society to go against the desires of health care consumers,
and anyone choosing to do so has little if any protection from
legal action. Suggesting to US patients that they should not
be availed of the latest treatment because it is too expensive
guarantees an ugly confrontation with overtones of
discrimination. All of this can simply be avoided by not
making QoL judgments in a society in which autonomy talks
and paternalism walks, especially on the basis of cost.
Alternatives to the approach I have outlined above inevitably
mean some form of rationing, a concept that is virtually
always rejected by health care consumers. However, as
health care cost continues to skyrocket, and the potential to
contain it decreases, some form of rationing may become our
only alternative [15]. If rationing arrives, then it will most likely
start with the most expensive drugs that benefit the smallest
number [16,17]. Right or wrong, more blatant use of
rationing will probably complicate our ICU existence
considerably [18].
I would try hard to establish a “do not resuscitate/do not
intubate” status in this patient. If the surrogate decision maker
could not be persuaded and insisted that the patient would
have wanted “everything done”, I would give the treatment.
Why the family gets to make a bad choice
David F Kelly
Cases such as this are rightly designed to arouse our
frustration and even anger at the widespread misuse of
scarce medical resources. The substantive question asks
whether there is an ethical obligation for this patient to
receive this drug. In terminology long used by the Roman
Catholic tradition, is the drug in this clinical situation ‘morally
ordinary’, and hence obligatory, or is it ‘morally extraordinary’,
and hence optional [19]? If the patient were competent to
choose, would he have a moral obligation to take the drug?
This question is not at all irrelevant despite what one might
think. We do have responsibilities to take decent care of
ourselves; we have duties to self, to others (family,
coworkers, and society as a whole), and, yes, in a very
different way to God. However, very few of us think that this
requires us to do everything possible to preserve our lives.
The benefits of the drug are limited to its effect on sepsis. It
will not change the other organ system inadequacies, with
their debilitating sequelae. This patient is unable to fulfill even
the most basic purposes of human life [20]. The drug merely
prolongs his long slow passage into death. He need not ask
for it. His family may quite rightly reject it and allow him to die
from the sepsis. Note that this decision is not as such
dependent on the drug’s cost; the family would also be right
to reject the cheaper antibiotics.
Cases like these incite us to switch decision-making authority
from patients and their families to physicians, who (it is
implied) will make ‘better’ decisions. Many of the early court
cases that ultimately gave decision-making authority to
patients and families were disputes in which families wanted
to stop treating comatose patients. Doctors often insisted
that it was in the patients’ best interests to keep them alive
by whatever means possible. Families fought to get their
power back, and the courts finally agreed with them. Thus,
families and patients now get to decide, and in this case the
family has, unwisely we might think, decided to demand the
expensive drug. Legally there seems to be no doubt; the drug
must be given if it is the medical standard of care for this kind
of sepsis. Doctors, relying on scientific studies, are allowed
to choose which drug is proper for which illness, but doctors
ought not make decisions based on the kind of patient who is
asking for the drug.
Why not? Because there are simply too many conflicts of
interest. In today’s financial climate, hospitals and doctors are
directly or indirectly rewarded for spending less. Do we really
think that physicians and hospital administrators should be
given the authority to make this kind of decision on a case-
by-case basis? The incentive may be to treat a wealthy
entitled person rather than an indigent. Providers ought not
make this kind of decision independently. This does not mean
that it is wrong for our society to make such decisions on a
policy basis. Also, in designing such policy, physician input
and advocacy is critical. Medicare can rightly decide not to
use the expensive drug for persons for whom it will do little or
no human good. In addition, this policy can be made explicitly
on the basis of cost. Societies have limited resources and477
may choose how to spend them. Most other nations in the
global community have figured out how to do this effectively,
and the final results seem no worse than ours.
As it stands, however, in this case the family gets to decide
because society has not figured out how to exclude them
rightly on the basis of faulty logic. The patient should receive
the drug.
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Is this a reasonable way to use expensive resources?
Stephen Streat
Points well taken… but…
Leslie M Whetstine
From a New Zealand perspective, this scenario exhibits an
‘Alice through the looking glass’ like unreality. It is
fundamentally rooted in US culture and medical politics, and
has no direct resonance in most of the rest of the global
village. In the USA, ‘surrogate preferences’ are given open-
ended primacy in medical decision making. Those
preferences often include intensive treatments in the
presence of irreversible organic brain disease, independent
of previously expressed wishes of the patient [21]. Although
almost 20 years have passed since we compared New
Zealand and US ICUs and their patients [22], the profound
difference in cultural and personal attitudes between our
countries alluded to in the discussion with respect to
‘expectations of immortality’ remain.
If the patient were admitted to a small local hospital in New
Zealand, the issue of intensive care admission (let alone
transfer to another hospital for highly expensive therapy)
would not arise because the treating physician would not
refer the patient to the ICU. Intensive care medicine is
recognized by patients, their families and treating physicians
to be a scarce and valuable resource that is explicitly
rationed. This belief is formally acknowledged in the
organizational structure and admission practices of ICUs.
Patients referred for admission are assessed by the
intensivist who is responsible for the ICU, and may be
refused admission on clinical grounds (including probability
of reversibility and expected post-ICU QoL). These issues
were previously discussed in detail [23].
Intensive care in New Zealand, other than short-term
postoperative ventilatory support after cardiothoracic surgery,
takes place within a government-administered public hospital
system, funded by general taxation. Groups of hospitals are
administered by local area health boards, which receive
capitated population-based funding, with some weighting to
reflect important demographic and geographic differences.
Such hospital groupings do include formal arrangements for
transfer of patients who require services – including high-
level intensive care [24] – that may not be locally available.
However, the ‘obligations’ involved in such arrangements are
determined again by clinical appropriateness, which is not
driven by ‘surrogate preferences’ and would not lead to the
transfer of a patient such as that described above for high-
level intensive care.
The recent study of drotrecogin-alfa recombinant in sepsis
[1] has highlighted the need to re-examine the relationships
between cost, ability to pay, and efficacy in intensive care
medicine, and to place those relationships in a wider medical
and social context. In a health care system that is publicly
funded from taxation, the use of this or similar expensive
novel therapies will inevitably lead to a politically untenable
need for increased taxation or to reduction in expenditure in
other areas of health care. In the absence of increased
taxation, this tension will be administered at local (area health
board) level and will therefore be subject to local political
representation and hospital pharmaceutical regulatory
committees. This process is likely to lead (as it has for other
expensive agents, such as iloprost) to limited availability of
the agent to patients judged clinically to be most likely to
benefit and who meet very strict prescription guidelines. In
this context, the putative patient would clearly not receive the
expensive agent in question.
All of the contributors agree that this therapy, if successful,
will not improve this patient’s baseline condition, but will only
treat an isolated clinical pathology that happens to be life
threatening. However, this reality is not sufficient in itself for
Kelly or Dellinger to refuse to provide it if families desire it.
Kelly concludes that this therapy can be considered morally
extraordinary and forgone by the patient or surrogate, but it
should not be a medical decision that is made unilaterally by
physicians.
Crippen argues for greater exclusion criteria for this
therapy, without which it has the potential to be applied to a
wide population of patients who are very sick, very old, and
at the end of life. He predicts an issue that Dellinger
laments we cannot or have not been able to prove, namely
that expending money on this prohibitively expensive
therapy carte blanche will impact on other therapies in a
real and quantifiable way, for the first time. Burrows and
Streat both work within health care delivery systems that
overtly ration, and therefore the dilemma presented by this
case is unlikely to be in issue in their communities. Their
societies have come to a consensus that authorizes
physicians to micromanage these clinical issues, often
expressly based on QoL.478
The discussants agree that the current health care delivery
system is flawed and they all endeavor make the best of its
constraints. Kelly calls for social consensus to guide the
appropriation of scarce resources, without which he is loathe
to displace families with physicians as decision makers
unless care is medically futile. Dellinger argues that we
should apply pressure on surrogates to authorize the ‘right’
decision. Crippen argues that these new therapies have
forced the QoL issue and lobbies in favour of strict inclusion
criteria based openly on QoL determinations. Streat and
Burrows sympathize with the plight of the Americans, but this
really is not their problem.
Kelly closes his analysis by suggesting that Medicare may
rightly refuse to cover these types of expensive treatments on
the basis of cost and their relatively thin therapeutic
effectiveness. By this logic, it would then seem acceptable to
base treatment decisions on cost and QoL so long as public
policy supports it. However, what can we do in the interim,
before these policies are in place, or if they are never
passed?
Practical experience suggests there are some things in life
that ought to transcend consensus. Maintaining only vestiges
of humanity at great expense on the basis of demand and
societal ambivalence is not an inconsequential issue. It may
be that society does not know the right thing to do, but the
Americans’ inability to arrive at an agreement is not a viable
excuse to sit back and helplessly watch as Burrows’ ‘tragedy
of the commons’ threatens resource allocation. However,
renegade physicians or ethicists are not the answer. If we
want enduring change, then we will need to restructure the
system at a fundamental level, not merely beat it into
submission.
Kelly’s reliance on policy making is probably our only chance
at bringing us closer to those countries that provide
competent medical care for their entire population. After all,
those countries are only in that position because they have
prospectively agreed to such mandates. Until we similarly
come to the same conclusion, physicians cannot operate
unilaterally without undermining the values that the USA
cherishes and without having to fight this issue at every turn.
Unfortunately, if our recidivist societal behavior is any
indication, then consensus will take a long time indeed. Thus,
we must have some protective measures in place for damage
control while the debate continues and while we work to
effect a paradigmatic shift.
The best answer to this specific problem is probably a hybrid
approach of Kelly’s and Crippen’s standpoints in tandem.
Individual hospitals would be wise to formulate policies that
are tailored to address the contexts in which these types of
therapies will be offered or not. The distributors of these
therapeutic agents should assume responsibility for how they
are marketed, and might consider labeling them as
contraindicated for those who are at the end of life.
Unfortunately, until society learns to balance individual
autonomy with the common good effectively, short-term
solutions may be our only recourse.
Critical Care    December 2002 Vol 6 No 6 Burrows et al.
References
Acknowledgements
LMW thanks her mother, Candace Whetstine, for her
thoughtful insights.
Competing interests
None declared
1. Bernard GR, Vincent JL, Laterre PF, LaRosa SP, Dhainaut JF,
Lopez-Rodriguez A, Steingrub JS, Garber GE, Helterbrand JD, Ely
EW, Fisher CJ Jr, for the Recombinant human protein C World-
wide Evaluation in Severe Sepsis (PROWESS) study group: Effi-
cacy and safety of recombinant human activated protein C for
severe sepsis. N Engl J Med 2001, 344:699-709.
2. Seltzer JL, Wordell CJ, Nash D, Johnson NE, Gottlieb JE: P & T
Committee response to evolving technologies: preparing for
the launch of high-tech, high-cost products. Roundtable dis-
cussion. Hosp Formul 1992, 27:379-380, 386-392.
3. Anonymous:  Understanding costs and cost effectiveness in
critical care: report from the second American Thoracic
Society workshop on outcomes research. Am J Respir Crit
Care Med 2002, 65:540-550.
4. Hardin G: The tragedy of the commons. The population
problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental
extension in morality. Science 1968, 162:1243-1248.
5. McIntyre RC Jr, Pulido EJ, Bensard DD, Shames BD, Abraham E:
Thirty years of clinical trials in acute respiratory distress syn-
drome. Crit Care Med 2000, 28:3314-3331.
6. De Gruttola V, Fleming T, Lin DY, Coombs R: Perspective: vali-
dating surrogate markers—are we being misled. J Infect Dis
1997, 175:237-246.
7. George Bernard Shaw: Prologue. In: The Doctor’s Dilemma [play].
8. Crippen D, Kilkullen J, Kelly D (editors): Three Patients: End of
Life Care in Intensive Care Medicine. New York: Kluwer Publish-
ers; 2002.
9. Ingelfinger FJ: Arrogance. N Engl J Med 1980, 303:1507-1511.
10. Shah ND, Vermeulen LC, Santell JP, Hunkler RJ, Hontz K: Pro-
jecting future drug expenditures: 2002. Am J Health Syst
Pharm 2002, 59:131-142.
11. Kanji S, Devlin JW, Piekos KA, Racine E: Recombinant human
activated protein C, drotrecogin alfa (activated): a novel
therapy for severe sepsis. Pharmacotherapy 2001,  21:1389-
1402.
12. Angus DC, Linde-Zwirble WT, Lidicker J, Clermont G, Carcillo J,
Pinsky MR: Epidemiology of severe sepsis in the United
States: analysis of incidence, outcome, and associated costs
of care. Crit Care Med 2001, 29:1303-1310.
13. Englehardt HT Jr: Critical care: why there is no global
bioethics. J Med Philos 1998, 23:643-651.
14. Savulescu J: Desire-based and value-based normative
reasons. Bioethics 1999, 13:405-413.
15. Gipe B: Financing critical care medicine in 2010. Cost Qual
1999, 5:14-26.
16. Farnalls M: The use of limited critical care resources: an
ethical dilemma. Off J Can Assoc Crit Care Nurs 1997, 8:23-
26.479
17. Lantos JD, Mokalla M, Meadow W: Resource allocation in
neonatal and medical ICUs. Epidemiology and rationing at the
extremes of life. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 1997, 156:185-
189.
18. Henderson A: Adult intensive care in an environment of
resource restriction: how should the unit director respond?
Aust Health Rev 1997, 20:68-82.
19. Kelly DF: Critical Care Ethics: Treatment Decisions in American
Hospitals. Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward; 1991.
20. Shannon TA, Walter JJ: The PVS patient and the forgoing/with-
drawing of medical nutrition and hydration. Theol Stud 1988,
49:623-647.
21. Cogen R, Patterson B, Chavin S, Cogen J, Landsberg L, Posner J:
Surrogate decision-maker preferences for medical care of
severely demented nursing home patients. Arch Intern Med
1992, 152:1885-1888.
22. Zimmerman JE, Knaus WA, Judson JA, Havill JH, Trubuhovich RV,
Draper EA, Wagner DP: Patient selection for intensive care: a
comparison of New Zealand and United States hospitals. Crit
Care Med 1988; 16:318-326.
23. Streat S, Judson JA: Cost containment: the Pacific. New
Zealand. New Horiz 1994, 2:392-403.
24. Joint Faculty of Intensive Care Medicine: Minimum Standards for
Intensive Care Units [http://www.jficm.anzca.edu.au/policy/
ic1_1997.htm].
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/6/6/473